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6Executive Summary
 Nicholas Kitchen, Editor, IDEAS Reports 
Southeast Asia has long been a crucially important region in world politics. The Cold War may have 
begun and ended in Europe, but it was waged most fiercely in Southeast Asia. As what one senior 
American official described as the United States’ ‘Middle East detour’ comes to an end, there is a 
renewed recognition globally that developments in Asia will determine the landscape of international 
politics over the coming decades.
The source of that certainty, of course, is the unprecedented economic rise of China, which is likely 
to become the world’s largest economy in the next twenty years in a world where interdependence 
increasingly sees imperatives of geoeconomics trump issues of geopolitics. China has made immense 
progress over the last thirty years in forging new economic links with a region that it was previously 
estranged from. In its support for the region during the 1997-8 economic crisis and in its substantive 
cooperation with ASEAN, China has convinced regional states of its benign economic goals. Nonetheless, 
in Southeast Asia the ‘great game’ of geopolitics is alive and well, even resurgent. Territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea pit regional states against an intransigent Beijing, even as they become increasingly 
economically dependent on China. The much-vaunted American ‘pivot’ to the region – Washington’s 
effort to ‘rebalance’ its foreign policy to focus on the preeminent strategic challenge posed by China’s 
rise – allows regional states to hedge against China’s more opaque intentions. At the same time, America’s 
return to the region it left in helicopters from the roof of its embassy in Saigon, provokes suspicions of 
its deeper purpose, not least in Beijing.
In all this, Southeast Asian states risk becoming pawns in a geopolitical clash between the two extra-
regional superpowers. This report analyses how the states in the region are responding to the challenge 
posed by the strategic interests of the US and China in their geography and economy. The contributors 
here find that most take a more benign view of Washington’s intentions than they do Beijing’s. Most 
regional states, too, see opportunity in being the object of the superpowers’ interest. Yet there is an 
inherent danger in these countries wanting to have their cake and eat it too, in that the desire for bilateral 
gains with the superpowers may carry the cost of sacrificing wider regional interests. Already, ASEAN 
unity has cracked under the pressure exerted by the new geopolitics of extra-regional contestation, as for 
the first time in the organisation’s history, ASEAN foreign ministers failed to agree a joint communique 
following their Phnom Penh meeting earlier this year.
7To take advantage of the opportunities presented by 
China’s rise and the United States’ pivot, Southeast 
Asian states need to stand together in the geopolitical 
contest currently taking place in the region. This is no 
easy task: regional states are caught in what game 
theory would view as a classic ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ that 
will require a deep degree of trust to escape. Yet it is 
only by avoiding the short-term gains of bilateralism 
and renewing regional multilateral structures that 
Southeast Asian states will be able to avoid being 
ultimately subsumed by the clashing superpowers.  
ASEAN represents a market of over half a billion 
people, with a combined GDP growth currently double 
the global average. Yet its consensual approach to 
fostering regional economic integration leaves it ill-
equipped to lead in the task of forging a regional 
strategy. ASEAN therefore requires reform and renewal 
to enable it serve as a third pole in the new geopolitics 
of Southeast Asia, with the capacity and authority 
to mitigate the strategic contest between China and 
the US. Failure to do so will mean surrendering the 
future of the region to the geopolitical interests of 
extra-regional powers. The alternative is for regional 
member states themselves to empower ASEAN to 
represent their collective strategic interests, and for 
Southeast Asia to forge a Southeast Asian future. ■
